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Abstract. To authenticate a web server, modern browsers check whether
a TLS certiﬁcate is valid. This check is socio-technical because, when the
technical validation fails, it may request the user to decide, intertwining
the usual technical issues with social elements, such as trust and cultural
values. Hence the need for a methodology aimed at a socio-technical un-
derstanding of TLS certiﬁcate validation. This aim is demanding not only
due to user participation but also because browsers behave diﬀerently. An
innovative methodology is outlined and demonstrated on the four market-
leader browsers, Chrome, Internet Explorer, Firefox and Opera Mini. It
involves modelling in UML the multi-layered interactions among servers,
browsers, and users and then translating them into a formal language
amenable to model checking socio-technical security properties.
1 Introduction
The cryptographic protocol to credit for HTTPS security is TLS. It enforces con-
ﬁdentiality and integrity by combining symmetric and asymmetric cryptography
as fully documented in the speciﬁcation of TLS [4].
The implementation of authentication, the other chief security property of
TLS, is less standardised. Based on asymmetric cryptography, authentication
cannot work without TLS certiﬁcate validation, a mechanism (recalled below)
to establish the sole owner of an asymmetric key pair. Notably, the TLS speciﬁca-
tion provided also for the case when certiﬁcate validation fails: “If the hostname
does not match the identity in the certificate, user oriented clients MUST ei-
ther notify the user (clients MAY give the user the opportunity to continue with
the connection in any case) or terminate the connection with a bad certificate
error.” [7]. The excerpt describes the scenario where a browser (a client) ﬁnds
a mismatch between the server name (hostname) that TLS transports and the
identity in the certiﬁcate, and advocates an interaction with the user without
detailing it, or termination. Today, this scenario occurs frequently, for example
when an intruder replaces the server’s certiﬁcate with his own, attempting to
masquerade as the server. Another frequent case of failed certiﬁcate validation
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arises with institutions that self-sign their own certiﬁcates rather than purchase
them from accredited authorities. In consequence, as we shall see below, au-
thentication depends on technical factors such as networking, cryptography and
certiﬁcation, but also on social factors such as user skills, education and trust.
Certiﬁcate validation has been studied variously, for example to avoid the
user’s oversight of warning messages [9], or to improve the readability of their
contents [3]. The most relevant existing work seems about the cognitive aspects
of human-computer interaction with the browsers. To position our work, it is
useful to note that we see the socio-technical system consisting of a web server,
a computer network, a browser, a user and possibly an intruder as a ceremony in
the sense of Ellison [5]. The various technical and social layers of a ceremony have
been recently identiﬁed [2], with a practically useful indication that certain layers
can be virtually compressed during the analysis to sharpen the analyser’s focus
on other layers. Our work complements existing human-computer interaction
studies by advancing what seems to be the ﬁrst formal analysis of properties of
certiﬁcate validation that are not only logically conditioned on the technology
but also on user actions — while the details of human behaviour and human
cognitive aspects are abstracted away.
We outline TLS certiﬁcate validation (Sect. 2), and assess it from a socio-
technical standpoint. We then study four main properties over what are currently
found to be the four market-leader browsers at present [1]: Chrome, Internet
Explorer, Firefox and Opera Mini. Therefore, sixteen socio-technical properties
of modern browsers are studied, and are all related to certiﬁcate validation. In
particular, when Firefox cannot validate the certiﬁcate of an honest server, it
allows the user to store it; it is found that, even if the user stores it, if Firefox
cannot validate a diﬀerent certiﬁcate for the same server in a second session,
it allows the user to store it again, remarkably, without checking that one was
already stored. This missing check allows the certiﬁcate of the second session to
come from an intruder, who could then masquerade as the server (Sect. 4).
This paper contributes well beyond the formal analysis of the sixteen proper-
ties, as it outlines an innovative methodology for the socio-technical analysis of
browser ceremonies. After trying out various graphical notations, UML activity
diagrams were found to bear the necessary ﬂexibility (Sect. 3). Building these
diagrams was a major hallmark in our understanding of the technicalities of the
browsers. However they are only semi-formal and not directly executable, while
our aim was to leverage on automatic tools to assess properties reliably. We
then derive a CSP# model along with an linear temporal logic speciﬁcation of
the properties of interest to input to the Process Analysis Toolkit (PAT) [8]. A
summary of the ﬁndings and some conclusions terminate this paper (Sect. 5).
2 Basics of TLS Certificate Validation
A TLS certiﬁcate is an X509 certiﬁcate, and consists of a numbers of ﬁelds. Many
of them are irrelevant to the focus of this manuscript, and shall be ignored.
An idealised TLS certiﬁcate associates an identity with a speciﬁc public key,
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and 〈ID ,PK ID , I , SIG〉 is its custom representation. Here, ID stands for the
certiﬁcate subject, the entity to whom the certiﬁcate is issued (such as a subject
name and URL). Then, PK ID is ID ’s public key, and I is the entity who issues
the certiﬁcate. The issuer I checks ID ’s identity oﬀ-line and vouches that PK ID
is ID ’s public key by aﬃxing I’s digital signature SIG to the certiﬁcate.
There are two main checks for certiﬁcate validation. One is trusted issuer
verification, to establish whether the certiﬁcate issuer is a trusted Certiﬁcation
Authority (CA). This is done by querying a sequence of CAs (up to a root)
stored by the operating system or by the browser itself. Notably, knowing which
CAs are trusted may vary from browser to browser, so this check is browser-
dependent. Legitimate and honest servers do not always purchase certiﬁcates
signed by a trusted CA, often preferring to sign their certiﬁcates themselves.
Self-issued certiﬁcates are risky because they cannot be veriﬁed by browsers,
raising the risk of man-in-the-middle attacks. This risk is our focus.
The other check is domain name verification, to establish whether the URL
requested by the user matches the ID in the server certiﬁcate. Even when the
server certiﬁcate can be veriﬁed, it may happen that the requested URL does
not match the certiﬁcate ID . This commonly occurs when an institution needs
to secure its own sub-domain (e.g., www.my.example.com), but it does not want
to purchase a large number of certiﬁcates. Also a failure of this check may be
risky. A domain veriﬁcation failure may conceal a man-in-the-middle attack. An
intruder could simply create a certiﬁcate for a domain that he owns, then get it
signed by a trusted issuer, and bundle it with the traﬃc for the user.
When the validation process described in the X.509 standard fails, browsers
may adopt certain mechanisms to decide whether the requested server can be au-
thenticated. There are three main such mechanisms. The ﬁrst two are inherently
socio-technical due to the human intervention, the third is purely technical.
Warnings. Browsers may warn the user when they receive a certiﬁcate containing
an untrusted issuer or the domain veriﬁcation fails. They warn users in various
ways, such as by pop-up windows, open padlocks or red address bars, but because
the present work is not concerned with interface layouts, no diﬀerence will be
made, but what counts here is that browsers may allow the user to abort or
continue with their requested server. How users decide is equally beyond focus.
Storing Server Certificates. When validation of a certiﬁcate fails, it may still be
the case that the user opts to trust the certiﬁcate, namely to accept its contents
as trustworthy. Browsers may support this scenario by allowing a user to store
the server certiﬁcates the user decides to trust. In consequence, when the server
is accessed next, its certiﬁcate validation will be immediate because its certiﬁcate
is found in a trusted store. It is clear that server authentication as established
in this scenario is a socio-technical property because it is mostly based on the
user’s trust in the certiﬁcate rather than on objective support provided by the
technology. Of course, storing server certiﬁcates is not always a secure choice.
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Fig. 1. Activity diagram for certiﬁcate validation in Chrome
HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS). It is a security mechanism that was
conceived to thwart SSL stripping attacks, whereby an intruder fools a user into
an HTTP connection to a server although the server is also HTTPS compliant.
In short, HSTS compliant browsers prevent “unsecured” HTTP connections to
HSTS compliant servers. The server transmits its HSTS compliancy to a calling
browser via a special header during a secured TLS session.
3 Modelling Browsers
Our ﬁrst contribution is to model how four relevant browsers implement the full
TLS certiﬁcate validation. In tackling browsers, we observe that there appears
to be no standard notation to describe them. Our choice is to use UML activity
diagrams to describe how browsers function. UML activity diagrams support an
intuitive representation of a TLS session, highlighting the validation mechanisms
of each browser. Also, they can be easily translated in a fully formal language,
with the help of their semi-formal semantics — in particular, we will translate
activity diagrams to CSP#, which is then fed to an automatic tool. A third
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advantage is that they can represent parallel actions (fork/join) and multiple
choices (branching), while other notations such as Message Sequence Charts or
the Alice-and-Bob notation, cannot.
We select the four browsers that are presently market leaders: Chrome, Inter-
net Explorer, Firefox and Opera Mini. They expose a variety of combinations
of the mechanisms seen in the previous Section. For example, Chrome declares
HSTS support, Internet Explorer uses warnings extensively, Firefox may seem
most complete, and Opera Mini clearly aims at being lightweight. We have built
an activity diagram per browser. Every diagram features three entities: User,
Browser, and Server. Browser is in turn divided into User Interface and Engine.
There is no room to present all diagrams, but Figure 1 shows the one for Chrome.
Entities have a begin circle that points to their own ﬁrst activity. Thick arrows
depict the ﬂow of activities among diﬀerent entities, while thin arrows stand
for the internal entity ﬂow. Arrow labels deﬁne the objects that are exchanged
between activities. Some activities need to access datastores, which are linked to
activities via dashed arrows. Most activities are self-explanatory and common to
all browser diagrams, such as Display Webpage and Type/Click URL. To keep the
focus on the browser, the server activities are reduced to Init. TLS, whereby the
server starts the TLS handshake on its side, and Finish TLS, where it concludes
the handshake. For example, Figure 1 shows that Chrome supports HSTS and
adopts diﬀerent certiﬁcate stores depending on the underlying operating system.
4 Socio-technical Security Analysis
We refer to socio-technical analysis since we focus on the technical aspects of
TLS certiﬁcate validation as well as the role of the user. Our UML models show
that browsers validate TLS certiﬁcates diﬀerently. As analysers, we question
whether such diﬀerences entail diﬀerent security, and addressing this question is
the focus of this and the next section.
4.1 A Prototype Methodology
Activity diagrams are only semi-formal, hence are not practical for formal ver-
iﬁcation. Aiming at automatic analysis, it is appropriate to use them to then
write a formal model on which a formal encoding of the properties of interest
can be veriﬁed quickly. Also, as it can be expected, the formal browser model
shall be augmented with models for the other relevant actors, that is an intruder
and a user. We have taken advantage of the user-friendliness of CSP#, a for-
mal modelling language based on the process algebra Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP) [6], and of the ﬂexibility of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) to
formulate the relevant properties. These form the input to the Process Anal-
ysis Toolkit (PAT), which over our experiments has computed outputs within
seconds. The full speciﬁcation is omitted here. Our prototype methodology for
the socio-technical security analysis of how browsers treat certiﬁcate validation
is as follows: (i) describe the browser under study as UML activity diagrams;
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(ii) use these diagrams to write a formal model; (iii) extend it with additional
models, respectively for an honest server, a user and an intruder; (iv) encode
the properties of interest in a formal language; (v) execute the extended formal
model and the encoded properties in PAT to assess the validity of the properties.
Additional models, for an honest server, a user and an intruder, are omitted
for brevity. In particular, the server can opt for self-issued certiﬁcates; the user
is modelled expressively as a non-deterministic process; the intruder, in line
with a Dolev-Yao one, owns another server, controls the network, and can fake
certiﬁcates at will but not tamper with encryption.
4.2 Socio-technical Security Properties
We describe four diﬀerent security properties. Each property binds elements like
TLS session, certiﬁcates and, notably, user choices.
Property 1 (Warning Users). A user whose browser receives an invalid cer-
tificate on a TLS session is warned about this by the browser before the browser
completes the session.
As explained above, a certiﬁcate is invalid if either trusted issuer veriﬁcation or
domain name veriﬁcation fail. We remarked that this can be the case in a variety
of scenarios, more ore less risky for the user. For example, some scenarios conceal
an intruder who attempts a man-in-the-middle attack inserting a fake certiﬁcate
of his own; others see a server self-issue a certiﬁcate for itself. By this property,
we set out to assess whether browsers warn the user that certiﬁcate validation
was not smooth.
Property 2 (Storing Server Certificates). A user who stores a certificate
that associates an honest server to its public key on a TLS session via a browser
is protected from man-in-the-middle attacks on future sessions with the same
server via the same browser.
When browsers receive an invalid certiﬁcate, they may still allow the user to store
it. If one assumes that a certiﬁcate in fact is trustworthy because it contains a
correct association between an honest server and the public key that legitimately
belongs to it, one could expect that future sessions with the same server will be
protected from man-in-the-middle attacks. We shall see in the discussion that
follows that this is not true for all browsers.
Property 3 (Applying HSTS User Security). A user who accesses a server
that sends an HSTS header on a TLS session via a browser that receives a valid
certificate about the server is protected from man-in-the-middle attacks on future
sessions with the same server via the same browser.
This property stands on a diﬀerent scenario from that of the previous one, al-
though their conclusions are equal. This scenario sees an HSTS compliant server
who sends a valid certiﬁcate to the browser that the user is using. However, it
remains to be checked whether the browser is HSTS compliant too, in which
case it whitelists the server because its certiﬁcate is validated once.
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Property 4 (Learning from Server Certificate History). A user who com-
pletes a TLS session with a server via a browser receiving an invalid certificate,
and then completes another session with the same server via the same browser
receiving a valid certificate is warned by the browser about the risk of man-in-
the-middle attack.
This property aims at checking whether the browser informs the user that a
man-in-the-middle attack might have occurred in a previous TLS session. For
example, let us consider a session where the browser receives an invalid certiﬁcate
from an intruder who is shading the required server; the browser may warn the
user about this (according to Property 1). If in a subsequent session the browser
receives a valid certiﬁcate about the same server, it may be taken as an additional
indication that something went wrong in the former session — hence the check
on whether the browser reinforces the warning to the user that she risked a
man-in-the-middle attack in the former session.
5 Summary of the Findings and Conclusions
We have translated all previous properties as LTL formulas and checked their
satisﬁability with PAT model checker on CSP#models representing our browsers
extended with server, intruder and user model. We have run the tool on each
of our four browsers, and on each of our four target properties, reaching sixteen
interesting ﬁndings. The properties are encoded in such a way that the tool never
incurs into state explosion. Interpreting the tool output required some eﬀort, and
the following table summarises the ﬁndings.
Browser Property 1 Property 2 Property 3 Property 4
Firefox × ×  ×
Chrome    ×
Internet Explorer   × ×
Opera Mini ×  × ×
Property 1 is found valid over Chrome and Internet Explorer. By contrast,
the model checker shows traces that falsify it over Firefox and Opera Mini. With
Firefox, the trace reports a sequence of two TLS sessions both with a man-in-
the-middle attack. In the ﬁrst session, Firefox warns the user, who chooses to
store the intruder certiﬁcate anyway. In the second session, the user tries to
access the same server, but this time Firefox has the intruder server certiﬁcate
stored, and completes the session without warning the user. This is due to the
drawbacks of storing server certiﬁcates, which Firefox allows its users to do. The
trace that falsiﬁes the property with Opera Mini is rather trivial because this
browser does not oﬀer any choice to the user at all. Opera Mini in fact shows
a padlock when the certiﬁcate is valid, but even if the certiﬁcate is invalid, the
browser completes the TLS session anyway, and without informing the user.
Property 2 turns out the most tricky. The outcome of our experiments may
seem surprising. It is found that all browsers verify the property except Firefox,
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although Firefox is the only one that allows a user to store server certiﬁcates. The
outcome is easy to explain in logical terms. The property is a logical implication
whose precondition is that a user stores a server certiﬁcate. Because no browser
except Firefox allows this, the property is trivially veriﬁed of all these three
browsers, which falsify that precondition. Most surprisingly, the property does
not hold of Firefox, which does not falsify the precondition. The user can in fact
replace a server certiﬁcate as many times as she wishes to, while Firefox does
not inform her that a server certiﬁcate was already stored.
Property 3 is found to be valid with the browsers that support HSTS, whereas
the tool outputs counterexamples with the others. Finally, checking Property
4 fails on all browsers, denouncing the stateless philosophy whereby browsers
do not record warnings they may have given in the past, hence they cannot
leverage upon them at present. This seems suggesting that, if browsers stored
and processed past warnings, they could help users estimate the trustworthiness
of current, yet invalid, certiﬁcates.
The socio-technical analysis of the security of modern browsers combines tra-
ditional analysis of the underlying technologies with elements of user participa-
tion. By doing so, it is oriented at characterising security properties also in terms
of what the user may accomplish, with the ultimate aim of building browsers
that are secure in the presence of humans. Our work pertains to various prop-
erties related to TLS certiﬁcate validation as carried out by four market-leader
browsers. It also outlines a general methodology that is being extended towards
the socio-technical analysis of browser ceremonies.
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